Faultless responsibility: on the nature and allocation of moral responsibility for distributed moral actions by Floridi, Luciano
rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org
Research
Cite this article: Floridi L. 2016 Faultless
responsibility: on the nature and allocation of
moral responsibility for distributed moral
actions. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 374: 20160112.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2016.0112
Accepted: 15 August 2016
One contribution of 15 to a theme issue




collective action, distributed moral action,
distributed moral responsibility, information




Faultless responsibility: on the




Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, 1 St Giles,
Oxford OX1 3JS, UK
LF, 0000-0002-5444-2280
The concept of distributed moral responsibility
(DMR) has a long history. When it is understood as
being entirely reducible to the sum of (some) human,
individual and already morally loaded actions, then
the allocation of DMR, and hence of praise and reward
or blame and punishment, may be pragmatically
difficult, but not conceptually problematic. However,
in distributed environments, it is increasingly
possible that a network of agents, some human,
some artificial (e.g. a program) and some hybrid
(e.g. a group of people working as a team thanks to
a software platform), may cause distributed moral
actions (DMAs). These are morally good or evil
(i.e. morally loaded) actions caused by local
interactions that are in themselves neither good
nor evil (morally neutral). In this article, I analyse
DMRs that are due to DMAs, and argue in favour
of the allocation, by default and overridably, of full
moral responsibility (faultless responsibility) to all
the nodes/agents in the network causally relevant for
bringing about the DMA in question, independently
of intentionality. The mechanism proposed is inspired
by, and adapts, three concepts: back propagation from
network theory, strict liability from jurisprudence and
common knowledge from epistemic logic.
This article is part of the themed issue ‘The ethical
impact of data science’.







































Collective responsibility1 is a rather familiar concept, as old as the Old Testament.2 According
to it, a whole group of people is held responsible for some of its members’ morally loaded
(usually immoral) actions, sometimes even when the rest of the group has had no involvement
at all (not even passively) in such actions. Equally well-known concepts are those of shared
responsibility, social or group actions and (the theory of) unintended consequences. When these and
similar phenomena are understood as being entirely reducible to the sum of (some) human,
individual and already morally loaded actions, then the allocation of moral responsibility, and
hence of praise and reward, or blame and punishment, may still be questionable and practically
quite difficult, but it is not conceptually problematic. It lies squarely on the shoulders of all the
individuals involved, totally, proportionally, in combination or perhaps not at all (exculpation).
However, in distributed environments, it is increasingly common that a network of agents—some
human, some artificial (e.g. a program) and some hybrid (e.g. a group of people working as a
team thanks to a software platform)—may cause morally good or evil (henceforth loaded) actions
through local interactions that are not, in themselves, morally loaded but neutral.3 In a previous
article,4 I defined such a phenomenon as distributed moral actions (DMAs). I shall not elaborate on
that analysis here because the focus of the following pages is rather a consequence of DMAs: what
happens to the allocation of responsibility when we are dealing with DMAs arising from morally
neutral interactions of (potentially hybrid) networks of agents? In other words, who is responsible
(distributed moral responsibility, DMR) for DMAs? This is the question I wish to address in this
article.5 In §1, I shall clarify why ethics usually disregards DMR. I shall argue that it is mainly
because ethics focuses on intentionality, which is, of course, not relevant in DMAs, the source
of DMRs. Put simply, the reasoning is that, without intentionality, there is no DMA, and hence
no DMR. This raises the question whether an ethics without intentionality may be meaningful
at all. So, in §2, I introduce a simple sandbox6 that will help clarify how good and evil may be
brought about even without any reference to (or indeed presence of) agents’ intentionality, and
why an ethics without intentionality is not only possible but actually a necessary complement to
the ethics of intentional actions. Without it, it may be virtually impossible to understand DMR.
After this preparatory work, in §3, I introduce a mechanism to attribute DMR to a network
of agents. The hypothesis is that a multi-agent system (from a whole society to just a group
of agents, some of which may not be human, e.g. a group of bots interacting online) may be
correctly interpreted as being equivalent to a multi-layered neural network. This is not very
different from Plato’s view in the Republic, where the individual and the city are discussed as the
micro- and macro-level contexts at which actions take place. The network interpretation enables
one to understand DMAs as the result of neutral interactions among the nodes of the network
(forward propagation), and therefore allocate and indeed manage DMR in terms of back propagation
1The standard references are [1–4].
2See Jer 31:29 ‘The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children’s teeth are set on edge’. And then Ezek 18:1–4 ‘The word
of the Lord came to me: What do you people mean by quoting this proverb about the land of Israel: “The parents eat sour
grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge”? As surely as I live, declares the Sovereign Lord, you will no longer quote
this proverb in Israel. For everyone belongs to me, the parent as well as the child—both alike belong to me. The one who sins
is the one who will die.’
3The case in which the actions of the agents are morally good (morally loaded positively) but once aggregated cause evil
effects (morally loaded negatively) is not discussed in this article, because the mechanism to locate responsibility in the
neutral case can easily be extended to this ‘loaded’ case.
4See [5]. The two articles form a diptych, but they do not presuppose knowledge of each other.
5Note that [6] contains no discussion of responsibility, accountability or liability. Royakkers [7] discusses responsibility only
‘forward’, in terms of obligation/commitment to do something, i.e. in terms of a logic of ‘seeing to it that’ an action or a
state is implemented (exercise of responsibility), not ‘backward’, in terms of blame/praise for something that has been done
(attribution of responsibility). The latter is the topic of this article.
6I use the term here in analogy to its technical meaning in software development, where a sandbox is a safe testing
environment that isolates untested code changes and experimentations from the production environment or repository.






































to all the agents in the network that bring about the DMA. I shall then introduce and adapt7 two
more concepts needed to make sense of DMR: strict liability (borrowed from jurisprudence)8 and
common knowledge (borrowed from epistemic logic). Let me hasten to add that especially the first
concept provides more an inspiration than a template for the proposed analysis.9 Two illustrative
examples will close that section. In §4, I shall comment on the mechanism introduced above by
discussing two features of the analysis just developed, two objections to it, and two challenges
facing it. In the conclusion, I shall highlight how the approach to DMR defended in this article
shifts the focus from an ethics of responsibility based on individuals’ intentional actions and
oriented towards individual punishments and rewards, especially for legal and religious reasons
(e.g. retributive justice or afterlife), to an ethics of responsibility based on groups’ interactions and
oriented towards environmental harm and welfare.
2. Why classic ethics does not focus on distributed moral responsibility
It is common to treat moral evaluations as monotonic,10 in the following sense. If something is
evil, it remains evil, even if it happens to lead to something morally good (henceforth simply
good). This is a major reason why we argue that a good end does not justify evil means, and why
accidental good consequences are not ground for praise. Likewise, if something is good, it remains
good, even if it happens to lead to something evil. This is a major reason why we promptly excuse,
and may even praise, people who cause some evil, if their intentions were genuinely good. Such
a monotonic stability is shared by both deontological approaches, where it is admittedly more
brittle (the pereat mundus approach), and consequentialist approaches, where it is actually more
flexible (see the tension between act and rule utilitarianism, for example). Most importantly for
our context, in ethics we often assume that what is morally neutral11 remains neutral: if actions a
and b are morally neutral, then their combination C = a + b not only does not but cannot acquire a
negative or positive moral value. Such a position is not incoherent, but it is criticizable in terms of
a modus tollens. Morally loaded actions do occur as a result of morally neutral actions—this is the
whole point of the tragedy of the commons,12 for example—but the view that this is not the case
should not be interpreted merely as a mistake, but more significantly as the correct consequence
of a premise, which in itself is mistaken and should be replaced. The premise is that the ethical
discourse should focus entirely and only on the intentional nature of actions. It is this exclusive
focus on intentionality that makes it very difficult for standard ethics to deal with the attribution
of DMR. Let me clarify.
7‘Adapt’ rather than ‘adopt’ because, as it will become clear, I refer to ‘strict liability’ only as a source, and not as an importable
concept, for the formulation of strict or faultless responsibility.
8One of the anonymous reviewers rightly pointed out that ‘All in all, I reckon that a more appropriate legal formula to convey
the idea of the author borrowing the notion from jurisprudence, can be “faultless responsibility”.’ I agree, hence the title of
this article. But I also noted that ‘faultless responsibility’ is a much less common concept than that of ‘strict liability’. A quick
search on Google, for example, returns 458 results for the former and about 3 840 000 results for the latter. Since in both cases
it is only a matter of mere conceptual inspiration, in this paper, I took the liberty of keeping the original formulation. The
reader is invited to switch to ‘faultless responsibility’ whenever this is deemed preferable.
9Strict liability is historically invoked and used in the legal field for two different reasons: (i) in order to assign liability for
faultless behaviours as a result of an objective, either direct or indirect, process of causation and (ii) in order to assign liability
as a result of a risk allocation despite a verified process of causation. Here I am mainly interested in the first meaning of strict
liability (as part of the process of causation). I shall come back to the issue of risk allocation in the last part of the paper, but
only tangentially.
10In logic, the monotonicity of entailment is a property of any logical system according to which the premises of a valid
entailment may be freely extended with additional premises without making it invalid. In mathematics, a function or
quantity is said to be monotonic if it varies in such a way that it either never decreases or never increases. The two senses
are strictly related, since they point towards invariance under changed circumstances, but I am using ‘monotonic’ in the more
mathematical sense of neither more nor less morally loaded than it was before the variation.
11By morally neutral, I mean here either not morally charged at all or below a threshold of moral relevance (virtually amoral).
This specification is crucial since one may argue that almost any action shows at least traces of moral value. Moreover, given
the right circumstances, any action may become morally loaded. Alice scratching her left foot may cause unspeakable evil if
one can imagine the right chain of causes.






































Intentionality is not closed under causal implication, whether direct or distributed. In the direct
case of non-closure, it is not the case that, if Alice means to cause a, and a causes b, it follows that
Alice means to cause b. In the distributed case of non-closure, it is not the case that, if Alice means
to cause a, and Bob means to cause b, and a and b cause C, it follows that Alice and Bob mean to
cause C. To be more precise,
(i) ¬ [[[A means to cause a] ∧ [a causes b]] → [A means to cause b]]
(ii) ¬ [[[A means to cause a] ∧ [B means to cause b] ∧ [a ∧ b cause C]] → [AB means to
cause C]]
Both (i) and (ii) are correct. But precisely because intentionality is not closed under direct or
distributed causal implication, the assumption of the intentionality of an action as a necessary
condition for an ethical evaluation of it leads to the oversight of DMAs and responsibilities. The
reasoning may be summarized in the following steps:
(1) the classic emphasis is on the allocation of individual punishments and rewards,
especially for socio-legal and religious reasons (e.g. retributive justice or afterlife), not on
the allocation of risks of environmental harm and opportunities of environmental welfare
(more on this later; see also [11]);
(2) so the allocation in (1) must focus on the attribution of individual responsibility;
(3) (1) and (2) lead to the identification of individual intentionality; it would be
counterproductive to attribute responsibility, and hence allocate blame or praise,
punishments or rewards, if the agents’ actions were not intentional, because such
attribution would then be arbitrary and indistinguishable from a mere random allocation,
which would defy the purpose of blame or praise, punishments or rewards, insofar as
these are meant to modify and guide possible choices and actions for the benefit of the
individuals involved and their society;
(4) but we have seen that intentionality is not closed under causal implication: when a DMA
C is in question, such resulting action is not intentional;
(5) but then it follows that no agents (say, neither Alice nor Bob), whose neutral actions bring
about C, are treatable as being responsible for C;
(6) therefore neither Alice nor Bob can be fairly punished or rewarded for C; and
(7) yet evaluating individual agents and their moral lives is the whole point of an ethical
analysis; therefore, DMR is a phenomenon on which standard ethics does not focus.
A direct consequence of (1)–(7) is that standard ethics either ignores DMAs and responsibilities or
seeks to reduce both to non-distributed versions of individual morality of intentional actions. Both
strategies are unsatisfactory. Ethics is not only a matter of evaluating agents and their intentional
actions, but also a matter of evaluating the states of the receiver of the action (the patient affected),
and hence of influencing the relevant groups of agents whose aggregated actions lead to such
states. If what drives the analysis is the question whether the patient affected is morally better
or worse off after an action has taken place, then intentionality may still be very relevant, but it
is no longer a necessary condition, and it becomes crucial to understand how one may allocate
DMR for DMAs that emerge from entirely neutral actions, so that the right actions are facilitated,
promoted, amplified and rewarded, and the wrong actions hindered, prevented, mitigated or
punished in reparation.
3. The three approaches to ethics: agent-, action- and patient-oriented
To understand how an ethics without intentionality—what I have defined elsewhere as mindless
morality [12]—may be possible, let me introduce now the sandbox I anticipated above. This is a














































































Figure 1. Example of an elementary finite-state automaton.
Aa







Figure 2. Graphical representation of an elementary finite state automaton.
or their intentional actions, but about the states of the environments affected by agents and any
of their actions.
Consider a finite state automaton (FSA [13]). An FSA is the sort of logical scheme that describes
how a vending machine works. Think of it as a system that consumes actions as inputs to deliver
changes of states as outputs, e.g. a payment and a choice of drink in order to deliver the chosen
drink. An FSA, as a simple scheme of action, is defined by
1. a finite set of states, for example four S: {S1, S2, S3, S4};
2. a finite alphabet (set) of input/actions, for example three A: {Aa, Ab, Ac};
3. a transition function f : S × A → S;
4. a start state S1 ∈ S; and
5. a set of acceptable states F ⊆ S.
Figure 1 illustrates the simple example of an FSA just introduced. It is read by checking which
action-input (e.g. Ab), given a system’s state (e.g. S2), puts the system in which output-state (in
this case S1). Figure 2 illustrates figure 1 graphically.
Because an FSA is a basic example of a system that moves from one state to another as a
result of action-inputs, it is the bare minimum sufficient to clarify some elementary features and
dynamics of a very simple system, a sandbox that makes it possible to identify some crucial issues
in the analysis to be developed. Remember that this sandbox is not a model (it does not represent
an existing system), a blueprint (it does not indicate how to build a system not yet existing) or a
thought experiment (it is not a mere matter of imagining a non-contradictory system, because it
comes with very concrete formal constraints) for an ethical system. It is a simplified environment
to test some ideas, in the following way.
In virtue ethics, we focus on the nature (e.g. their characters, intentions, inclinations, choices
or plans) of the agents that implement the action-inputs that lead to the transitions in the system.
In deontological and consequentialist approaches, we may disregard the nature of the agents to
focus on the nature of the action-inputs leading to the transitions in the system, thus moving from
an agent-oriented to an action-oriented approach. In environmental contexts, we may disregard
both agents and their actions to focus on the features of the system that we want to see pursued






































from the very elementary one I just introduced to the most complex and realistic ones, presents
three points of ‘pressure’ where a difference can be made to good and evil. To promote good
and eradicate evil, one may seek to change the nature of the agents, of their actions or of the
states of the patients (these are inclusive disjunctions). With an analogy, the ethical discourse may
focus on the cook, on the cooking or on the cooked. In [12], I have argued that a patient-oriented
approach is not only defensible but in some cases preferable for the development of our ethical
discourse. I shall not rehearse the reasons provided there in support of such a position, because
what matters here is that, once this tripartite distinction is available, it becomes clear that an
intention-based (agent- or action-oriented) ethics is not the only one available, and indeed that
an ethics of state transitions, independent of the intentions of the agents involved, can provide
a full account of DMR. All we need to assume is that, according to an axiological analysis, some
states of the system are morally better than others and hence worth pursuing for the sake of
the system itself. Understanding how they are brought about (the nature of the actions), and
according to which plans or intentions (the nature of the sources of the actions), may be crucial to
answer significant moral questions (including the classic ‘who should I be?’), but it is not strictly
necessary (it is not a sine qua non) to evaluate whether the moral patient, the receiver of such
actions, is morally better or worse off. One may imagine a scenario (a level of abstraction, see
[14,15]) in which no information13 is available about the agents involved or their actions. If the
only perceivable changes concern the state transitions of the system affected, as described in the
sandbox, one would still be able to provide an ethical assessment. Note, however, that the point
is not to develop such an axiology here.14 In this context, we can just assume that one is possible
and indeed available. In our sandbox, for example, we may simply stipulate that our axiological
analysis determines that S1 is a morally negative state (evil), that S2 and S3 are neutral and that
S4 is a morally positive state (good).
It seems clear that it is perfectly fine to talk about moral states independently of agents’
intentionality and the specific moral nature of their actions. And this means that we can finally
ask the question motivating this article: if a DMA fails to bring about an increase in the moral
value of the system—in our sandbox: if a DMA fails to move the system to S4 and keep it there,
who is responsible for it? Answering this question is the task of the next section.
4. How to allocate distributed moral responsibility
Attributing moral responsibility, irrespective of intentionality and information about the nature
of the agents involved and their actions, means focusing on which agents are causally accountable
for (i.e. contributed genetically to bring about) a morally distributed action C, rather than whether
agents are fairly commendable or punishable for C. This means talking about ‘responsibility’ in
the aetiological sense of being the source of (causally accountable for) a state of the system, and
therefore, as a consequence, of being morally answerable (blameable/praisable) for its state. This
may lead to, but it is independent of, legal liability, in the sense of being subjectable to sanction or
reward.15 And it either grounds or is independent of the concept of responsibility understood
as being in charge of something and hence seeing to it that something happens or does not
happen. The only assumption required is that the agents causally accountable can learn from,
and modify, their behaviour. In other words, we only need to assume that the agents in question
are autonomous (in the minimal sense that they are in charge and regulate their own actions, at
13In this article, I presuppose an informational analysis of knowledge (see [16,17]), yet nothing depends on this.
14I have developed an axiological analysis that is e-nvironmentally (hyphen intended) oriented in [12].
15It is clear that, at this point, a more careful analysis of causal relations is needed, yet this is left to a future work to see
which philosophical theory of causality better fits the analysis provided in this article. Here, the interested reader may note
that, on the legal side, the starting point is the classic [18], and on the philosophical side I would recommend [19,20]. I have
inclined towards an analysis of causality as a purely informational interpretation of continuous events at a given level of
abstraction (LoA) chosen for a purpose in [21], where I support a concept of ‘sufficientization’ (x is a sufficient condition for
y) at a given LoA for a purpose. This is close to the approach taken by Hart & Honoré [18] in terms of ‘purpose of the inquiry’
and ‘sufficient intervention’; see the Introduction, §1, entitled ‘Causation’ in [22]. On the analysis of the ‘failure of causation’




















































Figure 3. Amulti-agent system as a multi-layered neural network.
least to some significant extent), can interact with each other and their environments and can
learn from their interactions (can change the rules according to which they behave, again, at
least to some significant extent). If they satisfy these three necessary and sufficient conditions
(and most humans as well as some artificial or hybrid agents can; for a detailed analysis, see
[12,24]), then they give rise to a multi-layered neural network that can learn its appropriate internal
representations and hence any arbitrary mapping of input (the preceding history and context)
to output (DMA), and improve its behaviour. Figure 3 provides an elementary illustration of
the various elements in such a network. In it, the input of the network, on the left, is labelled
‘history’. It represents past information (e.g. circumstances, choices already made, past plans and
any information already available). The network in the middle—the two layers of nodes labelled
‘society’—transforms such input into an output. The output, on the right, is the DMA. Forward
propagation (from left to right) is how a DMA is outputted, while back propagation (right to left)
is how DMR can be attributed, in view of an improvement of the state of the system affected by
the outputted DMA.
In forward propagation, the agents in the network output, as a whole, a distributed action
that is morally loaded, by activating themselves and by interacting with other agents according
to some specific inputs and thresholds, in ways that are assumed to be morally neutral. In such
a distributed context, it no longer matters which agent does what or why. All that matters is that
the change in the system caused by the DMA is good or evil and, if it is evil, that one can seek to
rectify or reduce it by treating the whole network as accountable for it, and hence back propagate
responsibility to all its nodes/agents to improve the outcome. The cycle ends when the output
is satisfactory, according to the chosen axiological analysis. Real neural networks achieve this
stability by de-/activating specific nodes (agents) in the network and/or by finding the derivative
of error with respect to each weight of their links and then subtracting this value from the
weight value, until the desired outcome is obtained. In a social network, this is achieved through
hard and soft legislation, rules and codes of conducts, nudging, incentives and disincentives; in
other words, through social pushes and pulls. It follows that the analysis of DMAs requires the
following steps:
(a) identification of the DMA Cn;
(b) identification of the network N causally accountable for Cn (forward propagation);
(c) back propagation of moral responsibility to make each agent in N prima facie equally and
maximally responsible for Cn;
(d) correction of Cn into Cn+1; and
(e) repetition of (a)–(d) until Cn+1 is axiologically satisfactory.
Steps (a) and (b) are aetiological. They are conceptually uncontroversial, although their






































may surprise the moral philosopher but not the legal scholar, because it resembles strict liability.16
Especially, but not only,17 in tort law, strict liability is the legal responsibility of one or more
agents for the damage or loss caused by their acts or omissions, regardless of their culpability,
where the latter is defined in terms of intentionality of the action, possibility to control it and lack
of excuse. Under strict liability, there is no requirement to prove fault, negligence or intention.18
Interestingly, strict liability is most commonly associated with damage caused by animals and
defectively manufactured products. This is not accidental. The reference to animals is linked to
the need for a mindless morality, in a context where keepers of the animals become strictly liable
for their animal agents, to whom it is difficult to attribute moral intentions in the ordinary sense
of the expression. And the design perspective is consistent with the patient-oriented approach
adopted at the beginning of this article, which looks at the receiver of the action as a system
that is being designed by the agents issuing the actions. If the design is poor and the outcome
faulty, then all the agents involved are deemed responsible. One needs to show that some evil has
occurred in the system, and that the actions in question caused such evil, but it is not necessary to
show exactly whether the agents/sources of such actions were careless, or whether they did not
intend to cause them. It is important to note that strict liability has given rise to corporate liability
in criminal law. This establishes how far a corporation, as a legal person, can be liable for the acts
and omissions of the natural persons it employs. Yet, note that this is not how I intend to use the
‘family resemblance’ between ‘strict moral responsibility’ and strict liability, because I intend to
keep the same scope of applicability (all individual agents involved), not shift it (the network).
Here, faultless responsibility remains ‘theirs’ (agents’) not ‘its’ (network’s). All that is needed in
(c) is the mechanism of ‘responsible by default’ or poena sine culpa, to invert the Latin phrase [28].
Step (d) may require an overridability clause. Some nodes may share different degrees of
responsibility, including none at all, if an agent is able to show no involvement in the interactions
leading to C. I shall return to this point below, when discussing two examples.
Finally, step (e) may not be required, if the presence of back propagation of DMR is known to
all the agents involved, and this knowledge prevents an evil DMR from being outputted in the
first place. If all the agents know that they will all be responsible for C, it is more likely that C
may not occur, as they may restrain themselves and each other. This is social pressure, and I shall
say more about it in the conclusion. To achieve such a preventive result, a simple mechanism of
so-called common knowledge may be sufficient. Common knowledge of p occurs in a group of agents
G when all the agents in G know that p, they all know that they know that p, they all know that
they all know that they know that p, and so on ad infinitum. This is achievable through a public
announcement, an informative event that updates all the agents in G about p in a way perceivable
by all agents. Common knowledge through public announcement—two concepts in epistemic logic
well known to legal scholars in terms of common and public knowledge of the law—could be
pursued to put all the agents in G in charge of C, and thus increases the chances that they may
be able to prevent or modify an evil C or at least not participate at all in its delivery. This is the
substantive aspect in which DMR is very different from collective responsibility.19
16The history of strict liability is long and complicated, not least because it seamlessly interacts with the history of moral
responsibility in mutual interchanges of conceptual modifications. Two texts helpful in mapping the development of the
concepts are Vandall [25], who supports the extension of strict liability far beyond the area of products liability, somewhat in
line with the ethical argument developed in this article; and Epstein [26], who supports a purely aetiological analysis for the
evaluation of strict liability, another point on which I agree in this article.
17For an evaluation of the controversial extension of strict liability to criminal law, see [27].
18This is not trivial, since sometimes being innocent does not mean not being liable. There are laws that stipulate liability
regardless of any fault, that is, even if the person is able to prove that he or she is innocent, that person will be held responsible
for system failures. A typical example is the operator of a nuclear plant, which will be held responsible for any damage caused
by the nuclear plant. If people engage in dangerous (although lawful) activities that could harm the population, they are held
responsible for any damage that occurs as a result of such activities. In cases of strict liability, the defendant is allowed to
prove that he or she is innocent, which then leads to an exemption of liability.
19Note that this use of common knowledge and public announcement should be clearly distinguished from the issue of
‘knowledge of the law’. As one of the anonymous reviewers rightly remarked: ‘a “public announcement” of the law does not
necessarily amount to a “public knowledge” of the law: a legal public announcement refers to the public access to the sources
of law (and not necessarily to its knowledge, which normally requires the interpretation of the law)’. Here I am referring to






































Two examples may now help illustrate the previous analysis. They both come from The
Netherlands, and are known as ‘the three cyclists’ and ‘the four boats’.20
The Netherlands is famous for its friendly approach to bicycles and cyclists. The Dutch road
traffic regulations allow at most two cyclists to ride next to each other, if they do not endanger
others. What happens if a third cyclist joins them? Each binary action, describable as ‘Alice and
Bob cycling together’, is considered to be safe, that is, morally neutral in the vocabulary of this
article. But if several binary actions take place, hazard may emerge. The action C that comprises
more than two people cycling together is morally loaded negatively. In a context where there are
no DMAs and DMRs, one may assume that only the third person who joins the other two already
cycling together is to be held responsible, that is, only the one most left (the Dutch drive on the
right side of the road). Yet this is not the case. In 1948, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that each
of them is to be held entirely responsible, because it is very easy for each of them to rectify the
situation (HR 9 March 1948, NJ 1948, 370). This back propagation of responsibility means that all
cyclists pay attention not to be cycling together in more than two, not just in terms of not joining
a couple but also in terms of not being joined by a third cyclist.
Contrast this with a comparable yet different case concerning an equally famous aspect of
life in The Netherlands, namely boats, rivers and canals. Dutch law allows up to three boats to
be moored next to one another breadthways on the river (Merwede) outside harbours. In 1931,
when a fourth ship was moored next to three others, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that only
the fourth ship was responsible, because it was much more difficult for the other three to rectify
the situation than for the fourth that joined them (HR 19 January 1931, NJ 1931, 1455). In this case,
a DMA led to a DMR, but the back propagation identified only one agent as responsible, even if
the DMA required all four of them to occur.
The two examples remind us that understanding and insight will need to be exercised when
back propagating strict forms of DMR, but they also show that this is both possible and ordinarily
done.
5. Features, objections and challenges
Let me now comment on the previous proposal by highlighting two features, two objections and
two challenges characterizing the mechanism outlined in the previous section. The first feature
is its uncommitted stance. Interpreting DMA as being outputted by a network of agents—which
could be as small as three people cycling together and as large as an entire society—enables one
to design strict, back propagated, overridable DMR in ways that by-pass the classic intentionality
hurdle. However, it says nothing about the axiology implemented. Recall that, in our sandbox,
we merely stipulated the moral values of the four possible states of the system. This lack of
commitment is a positive feature. The mechanism of attribution of DMR is neutral with respect
to the actual moral evaluation of the output. It can work even to ‘invert’ a good outcome. In
our sandbox, it would be the same mechanism that would make the system move from S4 to S1.
This means—and this is the second feature—that an axiological analysis is unavoidable, because
the design of the mechanism of attribution of DMR is actually part of the design of a society’s
infraethics, rather than of its ethics. An infraethics is the ethical infrastructure that, although not
morally good or evil in itself, can facilitate or hinder actions that lead to good or evil states of
the system. Which states should be implemented or not is up to an axiological theory to decide,
but how easily they can be implemented is part of the infraethics, and the mechanism of DMR
attribution plays a significant role in the latter.
20For an elegant formalization of both examples in terms of deontic modalities and logic of action, see [7]. For a hybrid
example, not developed in this article, consider bots. In 2014, software agents known as bots completed about 15% of all edits
on Wikipedia [29]. Such bots are approved by Wikipedia and they are, on the one hand, collaborative agents that depend
on, and interact with, human users, who program them and can guide them (as well as switch them on/off), but, on the
other hand, they are autonomous agents, which can work interactively and learn from their environment. They can take and
execute decisions with or without human intervention and perceive and adapt to the context within which they operate. The







































Strictly responsibilizing the agents in the network that brings about a morally loaded change
in the state of a given system may seem unfair and against their fundamental rights,21 if no
intentionality is involved. This is the first objection. And it is reasonable. The answer to it is
twofold. On the one hand, some evil in the world, and the back propagated allocation of its
faultless responsibility, is tragic, that is, it is indeed unfair: one is found (or, more often, finds
oneself) responsible for C even if one (knows that one) could not have done anything to avoid
or prevent C. It is what Tony Honoré analyses in terms of ‘outcome responsibility’, which holds
even in cases of bad luck because, he argues, an attribution or assumption of responsibility is
acceptable simply on the basis of an agent’s intervention in the world [22]. On the other hand,
and this is no longer biting the bullet, when the circumstances are not tragic, the lack of reference
to intentionality is (at least partially22) counterbalanced by the presence of common knowledge,
reached through public announcement, about the mechanism in place: agents are (or need to be)
informed that a back propagation of strict DMR is implemented, in the same way as cyclists in The
Netherlands are (need to be) informed that all three will be sanctioned if a third cyclist joins two
already cycling together. In this way, the attribution of strict DMR is meant to play a significant
role in preventing evil and fostering good, not in blaming or punishing agents for their morally
unsuccessful actions.
The second objection questions whether the mechanism is realistic. Here, the response is that
we already apply a blunt version of back propagation of strict DMR. This happens when we
blame leaders (CEOs, Directors, Presidents, Prime Ministers, Generals and bosses of all kind) for
the mistakes made by those whom they lead, even if they lack any information or intentionality
about the latter’s intentions or actions. Indeed, we ask them to play such a role also, if not mainly,
because we lack a better way of allocating DMR. The mechanism suggested in this article is only
a refinement of that approach, and this is why it is more, not less, realistic. Instead of blaming
only some principal nodes/agents in the network, and often only one on the basis of some
conventions—the vulgate states that with great power comes great responsibility—the suggestion
is to allocate responsibility less coarsely, across all the relevant nodes/agents in the network. The
advantage is that the more people who are going to be deemed responsible for some evil, the
more likely it is that some of them will call for more caution to be exercised. Likewise, the more
people share in the praise and rewards, the more likely it is that good will be pursued. This is the
other side of the bonus culture.
The last point leads to one of the challenges I anticipated. The back propagation mechanism
may promote risk aversion, and this may be a difficulty. If all agents in the network are made
equally and fully responsible for the outputted morally distributed action—recall the three
cyclists example—then it is possible that some of them, more prudent, will adapt more readily
than some others, less prudent, to deal with such DMR. In the three cyclists example, some
cyclists may decide never to ride in a couple, just to be on the safe side; and a third, imprudent
cyclist joining a couple may force a more prudent member of the couple to leave. This is the same
phenomenon that makes it possible for reckless drivers on a motorway to be safe, by relying on
the restraint and extra care exercised by the majority of more careful drivers. The outcome is a
promotion of a few cases of irresponsibility counterbalanced by many cases of extra cautiousness.
This first challenge is due to the fact that the resilience of the network and its ability to improve
its performance is not based on all agents in the network sharing an equal degree of risk aversion.
As long as the network improves its output, the mechanism of back propagation of faultless
responsibility makes it irrelevant whether some agents contribute more or less to the performance.
This is in itself a problem of fair distribution of pressure: some agents will feel more in need to
improve the overall outcome than others. However, through time, interactions between more
21On the distinction between relative and absolute human rights, see [30].
22It is fair to object that this appeal to common knowledge does not address different agents’ relative costs of defection from
the network. To take a corporate example, a highly successful executive can afford to challenge a boss’s immoral policy
proposal, or even quit the job in protest, than can a young employee. This is another reason why an intelligent and informed
evaluation of the circumstances remains unavoidable. In terms of a sense of responsibility, individuals will feel differently






































prudent risk-averse agents and more imprudent risk-seeking ones should lead to an equilibrium
that can be rectified, if the agents involved find it unsatisfactory, in any combination of three
ways. First, the equilibrium could be improved by allocating further individual responsibilities,
which have not disappeared. The agent/node that misbehaves may still be held responsible for
any excessive risk-taking behaviour, i.e. behaviour that, in itself, is already morally loaded, as
with the reckless driving example mentioned above. Second, incentives and disincentives may be
designed to limit the effect of the lack of balance in risk-taking among the agents in the network.
This would be the equivalent of introducing more finely measured cases of responsibility between
the ‘four boats’ example at one end (the previous three boats have no responsibility) and the ‘three
cyclists’ example at the other end (all cyclists have full responsibility) of the spectrum. This can
be achieved by identifying circumstances in which DMR is back propagated proportionally to the
ability of the agents to avoid the negative outcome. Think of a case in which one of the three boats
could easily move, or neither of the two cyclists could possibly leave the group because a chain
connects them and they are driving to a locksmith to break it when joined by a third cyclist. Third,
social pressure from more prudent agents/nodes may constrain the more risk-prone behaviour of
the less prudent agents/nodes. In our example, the two cyclists may firmly complain to the third
one for having caused them to pay a fine.
The same social pressure may lead to the last challenge I wish to highlight. The back
propagation of faultless responsibility may stifle innovation and support a culture that is too risk
averse. If any agent in the network is fully responsible, morally, for what the network outputs as
a DMA, then this may encourage some or perhaps even all agents to refrain from acting or even
abandoning the network, if they can. In terms of the tragedy of the commons, nobody would use
the commons, just in case using it even once led to full responsibility for its depletion. This is not
a welcome outcome, for it would mean that opportunities would be missed, and resources would
be wasted. In this case too, the design of proper incentives to encourage agents to take some
reasonable and limited risks may be pursued. In economics, this could be a matter, for example,
of insurance policies to hedge against liability. In an ethical context, such moral hedging may be
provided by a better understanding of an agent’s duties towards proactive care of the system
affected.
6. Conclusion
In a world where the complexity and long-term impact of human–machine and networked
interactions are growing exponentially, we need to upgrade our ethical theory to take into
account the highly distributed scenarios that are becoming so increasingly common. Too often
‘distributed’ turns into ‘diffused’: everybody’s problem becomes nobody’s responsibility. This
is morally unacceptable and pragmatically too risky. It is why, in this article, I have sought
to provide a mechanism for the allocation of DMR caused by DMAs. Shared responsibility in
international relations may have to become faultless responsibility.23 In the course of the previous
pages, I have explicitly adopted a design perspective. I have argued that a successful strategy to
tackle the problem of DMR is to formulate a mechanism that, by default, back propagates all the
responsibility for the good or evil caused by a whole causally relevant network to each agent in
it, independently of the degrees of intentionality, informed-ness and risk aversion of such agents
(faultless responsibility). The shift in perspective is from an agent-oriented ethics, which cares
about the individual development, social welfare and ultimate salvation, to a patient-oriented
ethics, which cares about the affected system’s well-being and ultimate flourishing. To put it
bluntly, this means shifting the focus from an agent’s interest to a patient’s harm. Our world
may not need an ethics for Paradise and individual sins, but it definitely needs an ethics for Eden
and environmental risks.
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